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THE GHOST IN THE COURTROOM: WHEN 
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ABSTRACT 
  Judicial opinions captivate the legal community, serving as a hub 
for teaching new lawyers and developing the law. These opinions also 
provide a method for the justice system to communicate with the people 
it serves—both the parties to the cases and the public. This 
communication should be well-reasoned and developed from a neutral 
standpoint. However, this ideal is being seriously threatened by 
ghostwriting, the practice of allowing a party to write the opinion. This 
is particularly troubling in criminal cases, where the very lawyers 
charged with prosecuting defendants are writing the opinions against 
them. 
  This Note proposes that opinions written by prosecutors should be 
subject to de novo appellate review. Additionally, states should pass 
legislation and revise ethics rules to require that judges critically review 
a proposed opinion, refrain from adopting it verbatim, give the 
opposing party an opportunity to reply, and write an original legal 
analysis section.  
  Change is necessary to ensure that opinions are not just a recitation 
of a prosecutor’s argument, but a thoughtful product of an impartial 
judge. Left unchecked, ghostwriting will destroy the value of opinions 
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I suggest to you strongly that you avoid as far as you possibly 
can simply signing what some lawyer puts under your nose. 
These lawyers, and properly so, in their zeal and advocacy 
and their enthusiasm are going to state the case for their side 
in these findings as strongly as they possibly can. When these 
findings get to the courts of appeals they won’t be worth the 
paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of 
appeals in determining why the judge decided the case.  
– Judge J. Skelly Wright1 
INTRODUCTION 
The judicial opinion is the “external manifestation of an internal 
deliberative process.”2 An opinion not only informs both parties and 
appellate courts of the decision, but illuminates the judge’s thought 
process in reaching a conclusion as well. However, despite Judge 
Wright’s advice against the practice, judges often publish, as their own, 
opinions that were written entirely by a party in the case. In doing so, 
the insight of the judge is lost.  
Ghostwriting, as it is called, is particularly dangerous in criminal 
cases. When a person’s freedom or life is on the line, allowing the 
prosecutor to write the opinion dismantles the foundational 
impartiality that undergirds the legitimacy of the justice system. 
This issue was highlighted two years ago when Mr. Doyle Lee 
Hamm appealed his case to the Supreme Court.3 In 1987, Hamm 
 
 1. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4 (1964) (quoting Judge J. 
Skelly Wright, Seminars for Newly Appointed United States District Judges (1963)).  
 2. Jesse N. Panoff, Why State Trial Court Judges Should Write Their Own Decisions: 
Transforming the Current System, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 307, 326 (2009).  
 3. For examples of the numerous articles spotlighting Doyle Lee Hamm’s case, see  Radley 
Balko, In Alabama Death Penalty Cases, Judges’ Opinions are Routinely Written by Prosecutors, 
WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/06/23/in-
alabama-death-penalty-cases-judges-opinions-are-routinely-written-by-prosecutors/ [https:// 
perma.cc/E7ZC-B3AP]; Andrew Cohen, Letting Prosecutors Write the Law, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (July 18, 2016), https://themarshallproject.org/2016/07/18/letting-prosecutors-write-the-
law [https://perma.cc/J2SA-T4QV]; Andrew Cohen, The Death Penalty Case Where Prosecutors 
Wrote the Judge’s ‘Opinion,’ THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 19, 2016), 
https://themarshallproject.org/2016/06/19/the-death-penalty-case-where-prosecutors-wrote-the-
judge-s-opinion [https://perma.cc/7ZRW-ZKYC]; Andrew Cohen, When Prosecutors Write 
Opinions that Judges Sign Off On, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://brennancenter.org/analysis/when-prosecutors-write-opinions-judges-sign [https:// 
perma.cc/A6QV-3D6H]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Cert Petition Says Judge’s 89-Page Opinion was 
Ghostwritten by Prosecutors, ABA J. (July 21, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
ULATE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  5:03 PM 
2019] THE GHOST IN THE COURTROOM 809 
received a death sentence in Alabama after his lawyer put on a mere 
nineteen minutes of mitigation evidence.4 In 1991, Hamm filed a post-
conviction motion, largely seeking relief for his trial counsel’s failure 
to present evidence of Hamm’s brain damage at sentencing.5 When his 
post-conviction hearing was finally held eight years later, on December 
3, 1999, the State submitted to the court an eighty-nine-page “Proposed 
Memorandum Opinion.”6 The court adopted this opinion verbatim on 
Monday, December 6, 1999.7 In his haste to adopt the prosecutor’s 
work, the judge even failed to remove the word “Proposed” from the 
signed opinion.8  
When Hamm’s case reached the Eleventh Circuit, Judge 
Adalberto Jordan expressed his disbelief: 
I don’t believe for a second that that judge went through 89 pages in 
a day and then filed that as his own. As if he had gone through 
everything, went through his notes, the transcript, the exhibits, and 
the like. It just can’t be done! It just can’t be done.9 
However, working with a fairly restrictive standard of review—
deference to the lower court’s decision unless contrary to federal 
law10—the Eleventh Circuit demoted the ghostwriting issue to a 
footnote, calling the adoption of the prosecutor’s proposed order a 
“procedural shortcut” that they “strongly criticize[d],” but upholding 
the order nonetheless.11 
The uncritical adoption of a proposed opinion in Hamm’s post-
conviction hearing leaves doubt as to whether the trial judge properly 
reviewed a claim that could have saved Hamm’s life. The Supreme 
 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/cert_petition_says_judges_89_page_opinion_was_ghost
written_by_prosecutors [https://perma.cc/4E63-L365] (all spotlighting Doyle Lee Hamm’s case).  
 4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hamm v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 620 F. App’x 
752 (2016) (No. 13-14376). 
 5. Id. at 6–8. Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 allows criminal defendants to file 
post-conviction motions in trial court. Ala. R. Crim. P. Rule 32.2(a)(1).  
 6. Hamm, 620 F. App’x at 756 n.3.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting Oral Argument at 24:50–25:28).  
 10. Hamm, 620 F. App’x at 772. 
 11. Id. at 756 n.3. The court ultimately held that the practice did not affect Hamm’s habeas 
appeal. Id. 
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Court denied certiorari in Hamm’s case,12 and Alabama unsuccessfully 
attempted to execute Hamm on February 22, 2018.13  
Ghostwriting by prosecutors occurs across the country.14 Because 
of its secretive nature, it is difficult to quantify just how pervasive 
ghostwriting is,15 and this Note will not attempt to do so. Instead, this 
Note focuses on the problems created by ghostwritten opinions, 
particularly in criminal cases, and proposes the following solutions for 
curbing their impact. 
Judicial opinions written by prosecutors should be subject to de 
novo review in appellate courts. De novo review should occur when 
there is evidence that the judge did not critically review a proposed 
opinion before adopting it, or when the judge did not give the defense 
an opportunity to reply to the proposed opinion. Additionally, states 
should set standards for judges reviewing proposed opinions through 
clear ethics rules or legislation. The standards should require the judge 
to critically review a proposed opinion, to refrain from adopting it 
verbatim, to give the opposing party an opportunity to reply, and to 
 
 12. Hamm v. Allen, 137 S. Ct. 39 (2016).  
 13. Mr. Hamm has lymphatic cancer and carcinoma, which doctors warned would make 
finding a vein for lethal injection difficult. Nevertheless, the State attempted to execute him, 
continuing to puncture Mr. Hamm in his legs and groin for hours. The State even punctured his 
bladder, causing him extreme pain, before finally giving up with the midnight deadline looming. 
Hamm’s legal team reached a private settlement with Alabama to stop all attempts at execution 
in exchange for a dismissal of all litigation in Hamm’s case. Roger Cohen, Death Penalty Madness 
in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/opinion/death-
penalty-alabama-doyle-lee-hamm.html [https://perma.cc/34VH-NTKZ]; Melissa Brown, 
Alabama, Death Row Inmate Reach Settlement After Botched Execution, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER (Mar. 27, 2018, 10:13 AM), https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/
crime/2018/03/27/https-montgomeryadvertiser-story-news-local-solutions-journalism-2018-03-
20-can-alabama-try/461862002/ [https://perma.cc/UJZ5-SLWR]. 
 14. See, e.g., Fields v. Kentucky, No. 2013-SC-000231-TG, 2014 LEXIS 118, at *12–14 (Ky. 
Sept. 18, 2014) (explaining how a judge adopted verbatim the prosecutor’s proposed findings and 
conclusions in a post-conviction hearing). For additional instances, see Cohen, Letting 
Prosecutors Write the Law, supra note 3 (noting instances of ghostwriting by prosecutors in 
Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky, South Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Alabama). See 
generally Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284 (2010) (reviewing an order written by the State and 
adopted verbatim by a judge in a capital habeas proceeding); Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 901 
N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 2009) (vacating death sentence and publicly reprimanding the trial-court judge 
after he asked an assistant county prosecutor to prepare a sentencing order via ex parte 
communications). 
 15. Judges sometimes have ex parte communications with prosecutors to ask them to write 
opinions, making it even harder to discover when the State has authored an opinion. See, e.g., 
Stuard, 901 N.E.2d at 790.  
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write an original legal analysis section. These changes will substantially 
mitigate the dangers of ghostwritten opinions.  
Part I of this Note provides background on judicial opinions, 
ghostwriting, and the relevant case law. Part II describes the problems 
that ghostwritten opinions pose for the parties’ individual case, future 
cases, and the wider legitimacy of the judicial system. Part III suggests 
solutions; specifically, to treat criminal cases differently and change 
judicial ethics rules. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before understanding the ills of ghostwritten opinions, it is 
important to explore the forces that produce them, especially the 
limited time and resources of trial-court judges.16 This Part first 
explains when and how judicial opinions are typically written. A 
description of ghostwritten opinions follows. Finally, the Part 
concludes with a survey of the current case law surrounding opinions 
ghostwritten by a party.  
A. Judicial Opinions 
Generally, a party to a case has no right to a judicial opinion.17 
Nevertheless, some state constitutions require that judges write 
opinions.18 There are also circumstances in which federal judges are 
required to explain their decisions in writing.19 For instance, in criminal 
trials without a jury, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require 
the court to state its findings in open court or to write an opinion.20 This 
requirement reflects a policy preference for written explanations of 
judicial outcomes. 
 
 16. Ghostwriting appears to occur more often in state courts. Cohen, Letting Prosecutors 
Write the Law, supra note 3. However, understanding the full extent of the problem, at both 
federal and state levels, would require extensive empirical research.  
 17. Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 525 (2015) (“Legal scholars have observed that there 
has never been a common law duty for judges to give reasons . . . .” (citation omitted)) [hereinafter 
Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons].   
 18. See id. at 526 n.252 (citing various statutes to support the proposition that “[a] number 
of state constitutions currently provide constitutional requirements for judges to give reasons, 
write opinions, or both” and that “[t]hese state requirements usually apply only to the state 
Supreme Court, but a few also apply generally to all the courts of the state”).  
 19. See id. at 526 (“A few statutory and doctrinal mechanisms exist to constrain federal 
judges’ reason-giving, but they do not amount to a universal duty to give reasons.”).  
 20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c). 
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Written explanations from lower courts assist appellate courts in 
properly reviewing decisions.21 Appellate courts afford varying degrees 
of deference to trial court decisions depending on the issues presented 
by, and the posture of, the case.22 Questions of law are reviewed de 
novo, meaning that there is no deference to the trial court.23 Questions 
of fact are reviewed for clear error, so the appellate court will defer to 
the trial court absent a blatant mistake.24 Mixed questions of law and 
fact are reviewed either de novo or for abuse of discretion.25 Under the 
latter standard, the appellate court defers to trial court decisions that 
are not clearly unreasonable.26  
Judicial opinions usually follow a familiar structure. A trial court’s 
decision typically includes descriptions of the nature of the case, facts, 
issues, explanations of law and reasoning, and the holding.27 The bulk 
of an opinion consists of the facts and legal reasoning. The facts drive 
the decision because the law applied is limited by the facts of the case.28 
Although facts themselves are objective, they can be emphasized, de-
emphasized, omitted, or framed with adjectives intended to persuade 
the reader. The legal reasoning section, where pertinent law and 
analysis are presented,29 is the judge’s opportunity to describe his or 
her thought process for future readers and reviewers. 
 
 21. See Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons, supra note 17, at 507. 
 22. See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (giving broad 
deference to a district court on evidentiary rulings because of “a district court’s familiarity with 
the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters”); see also John F. Reif, 
Standards of Review, 79 OKLA. B.J. 34, 34 (2008) (“A standard of review is the legal scale to be 
used by an appellate court in weighing a claim of error.” (citation omitted)). 
 23. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996) (holding that determinations 
of probable cause in a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo). See generally Daniel 
Solomon, Identifying and Understanding Standards of Review, The Writing Center at GULC 
(2013), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Standards-of-Review.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/CF8B-27GE] (discussing various standards of appellate review). 
 24. See Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Folsom, 85 U.S. 237, 252 (1874) (explaining that 
findings of fact by the trial court cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court); Solomon, supra note 
23. 
 25. Solomon, supra note 23. 
 26. Id. 
 27. JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 37 fig.6 (5th ed. 2007).  
 28. Id. at 162 (“The facts control the outcome of the case.”). 
 29. Id. at 181. 
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B. Ghostwriting Opinions 
Some judges do not independently write the entirety of their 
opinions, instead delegating some or all of the work to the winning 
party of a case.30 In some instances, judges will adopt just a party’s 
findings of fact, while in others, a judge will adopt an entire proposed 
opinion, including the legal analysis.31 Most disconcertingly, judges 
occasionally adopt proposed opinions verbatim.32 These instances 
should be distinguished from ones where the judge makes grammatical 
and substantive edits.33 Those cases at least indicate some review of the 
proposal. Judges sometimes announce a decision from the bench and 
then request proposed findings.34 Judges may ask both parties for 
 
 30. See Ghostwrite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/ghostwriting [https://perma.cc/YG2M-8T5H] (defining “ghostwrite” as “to write for 
and in the name of another”). Scholars have thoroughly discussed the use of law clerks in judicial 
writing, which this Note does not address. See, e.g., Carol M. Bast & Linda B. Samuels, Plagiarism 
and Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing: The Need for Intellectual Honesty, 57 
CATH. U. L. REV. 777, 800–01 (2008) (noting that judges frequently ask law clerks to draft the 
first or final version of the opinion); J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or For Worse, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 321, 332–34 (1988) (listing opinion writing as one of the law clerk’s tasks); Jeffrey 
S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1307, 1341 (2011) (concluding that there is “strong evidence that [Supreme 
Court] Justices are increasingly relying on their clerks when writing opinions”); Albert Yoon, 
Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 131, 132 (2014) 
(noting that “recent evidence suggests that judges—including Justices—increasingly rely on their 
clerks when writing opinions”). 
 31. Compare E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 638 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(noting that the district court adopted one of the party’s findings and conclusions verbatim in a 
racial discrimination suit), with Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960, 962 
(5th Cir. 1975) (identifying that the trial court adopted one party’s proposed opinion without 
notification to opposing party in a patent case).  
 32. See, e.g., Hamm v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 620 F. App’x 752, 756 n.3 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 33. See, e.g., Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 731 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that the 
lower court made some grammatical and stylistic edits to the proposed opinion and made two 
minor substantive changes); Bingham v. Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Ky. 1982) (noting that 
the trial judge “made several additions and corrections [to the proposed opinion] to reflect his 
decision”).  
 34. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964) (explaining that 
the court announced its decision and then requested findings from one party, which the court 
adopted verbatim); Holbrook v. Institutional Ins. Co. of Am., 369 F.2d 236, 242 (7th Cir. 1966) 
(same); Fields v. Kentucky, No. 2013-SC-000231-TG, 2014 LEXIS 118, at *12 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2014) 
(noting that the judge made a ruling and then asked the prosecutor to submit proposed findings 
and conclusions). 
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proposed opinions.35 In other instances, they may withhold judgment 
and request a proposed opinion from a single party before issuing a 
decision.36  
There is no clear explanation for why judges employ certain 
ghostwriting practices over others.37 But all ghostwriting likely occurs 
because of judges’ lack of time and resources.38 Many judges do not 
have law clerks.39 This is especially true of state-court trial judges, 
whose dockets can be extensive.40 In 2008, the median state court 
docket contained more than 1500 non-traffic cases per judge.41 Writing 
an opinion takes time—a precious commodity for judges with heavy 
caseloads. The need for more resources in the justice system is a 
problem too large for this Note to address. However, additional 
judicial resources would likely reduce ghostwriting by parties 
significantly.  
 
 35. See, e.g., Prater v. Cabinet, 954 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. 1997) (noting that the trial court 
requested proposed findings from both parties before adopting one verbatim); State v. Ahmed, 
No. 05-BE-15, 2006 WL 3849862, at *70 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006) (noting that where the 
defense was provided with copies of the prosecution’s findings, allowed to file objections, and 
provided with the opportunity to provide the court with its own findings).  
 36. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 901 N.E.2d 788, 790 (Ohio 2009) (explaining 
that the trial court asked an assistant county prosecutor to prepare a sentencing order via ex parte 
communications). 
 37. Variances are likely the result of differing cultures of courts and jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Letter from David M. Toeper, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, to Judges Peter J. Kontos, 
Andrew D. Logan, W. Wyatt McKay and John M. Stuard (Dec. 5, 2006), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/documents/2891965-2006-12-5-Letter-to-Trumbull-County-
Judges [https://perma.cc/9UKK-PFX2] (stating that “it has been the custom and practice of [the 
Trumbull County Criminal Division] to . . . draft[] entries at [judges’] request and direction”). 
 38. See Cohen, Letting Prosecutors Write the Law, supra note 3 (“The practical problem is 
that so many judges are so overworked and understaffed that they use ghostwriting by state 
attorneys to help move along cases that might otherwise take months or years to resolve.”).  
 39. There are approximately 30,000 state judges and 1,700 federal judges in the country, 
while there are only a little over 15,000 law clerks. UNIV. OF DENVER QUALITY JUDGES 
INITIATIVE, FAQS: JUDGES IN THE UNITED STATES 3; Occupational Employment and Wages, 
May 2017: Judicial Law Clerks, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/oes231012.htm#(1) [https://perma.cc/QF67-Y84E]. 
 40. State courts handled 84.2 million cases in 2016. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, TOTAL 
INCOMING CASES IN STATE COURTS, 2007-2016, http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media//
7F3DA5FEF1BF4BE1BE2BDE6BA0E86C60.ashx [https://perma.cc/JR2D-HMRL]. 
 41. R. LAFOUNTAIN, R. SCHAUFFLER, S. STRICKLAND, C. BROMAGE, S. GIBSON & A. 
MASON, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN 
ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 21 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/
media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx [https://perma.cc/UF6R-K5RP] (showing 
1,929 median incoming non-traffic cases for unified courts and 1585 for general jurisdiction 
courts). 
ULATE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  5:03 PM 
2019] THE GHOST IN THE COURTROOM 815 
Regardless, tasking a party—especially a prosecutor—to write the 
opinion is an inappropriate solution to inadequate resources. 
Delegation deprives stakeholders and the reviewing court of a written 
account of the judge’s decision and analysis—the very reason that 
written opinions are preferred at all. Ghostwriting by prosecutors 
appears to happen more frequently in some states than in others,42 
indicating that some courts manage to address similar resource scarcity 
without delegating opinion writing to the prosecution.43 The solutions 
this Note offers would similarly allow judges to conserve resources—
without sacrificing impartiality and written reasoning—by using 
proposed opinions from both parties to craft their own opinions. 
C. Ambiguous Case Law 
1. The Supreme Court has called into question the legitimacy of 
ghostwritten opinions.  The Supreme Court is no stranger to 
ghostwritten opinions. In a 1964 case, the Court decided that 130 
findings of fact and one conclusion of law in a civil suit that were 
drafted by a party and adopted verbatim were still “formally” made by 
the judge.44 However, the Court also noted that opinions “drawn with 
the insight of a disinterested mind are . . . more helpful to the appellate 
court.”45 In subsequent cases, the Court more forcefully criticized 
verbatim adoptions, but ultimately accepted their legality nonetheless.  
In the 1985 case Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,46 the Court 
held that the Fourth Circuit erred in applying a stricter standard of 
review to a ghostwritten opinion.47 In Anderson, after a two-day trial, 
the district court issued a brief memorandum finding for the plaintiff 
 
 42. See Cohen, Letting Prosecutors Write the Law, supra note 3 (describing states where 
ghostwriting occurs). 
 43. This phenomenon cannot be attributed to an uneven distribution of work between the 
states. For example, California does not have documented prevalent ghostwriting, while Texas 
and Alabama do. Cohen, Letting Prosecutors Write the Law, supra note 3. Yet, California had an 
average of 2,157 incoming non-traffic cases per judge in 2008, whereas Texas and Alabama had a 
lower average of 1,982 and 1,570, respectively. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 21.  
 44. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964) (discussing a civil suit 
regarding § 7 of the Clayton Act, where the judge announced the judgment from the bench, then 
requested appellees to write the opinion).  
 45. Id. at 656–57 n.4 (citing Judge J. Skelly Wright, Seminars for Newly Appointed United 
States District Judges (1963)).  
 46. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). 
 47. Id. at 571. 
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on a Title VII discrimination suit.48 The memorandum explained the 
judge’s rationale and requested that the plaintiff submit proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as an expansion of the 
memorandum.49 The plaintiff submitted proposed findings.50 The court 
then asked the defendant to submit objections,51 to which the plaintiff 
was allowed to respond.52 These submissions in hand, the court 
adopted the plaintiff’s proposed findings with some revisions.53  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit declined to analyze the district 
court’s findings under the usual clear-error standard and instead 
subjected the adopted findings to a more demanding standard of 
review. The Fourth Circuit explained that “close scrutiny of the record 
in this case [was] justified by the manner in which the opinion was 
prepared.”54 The court noted that it had previously condemned “the 
practice of adopting the prevailing party’s proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law” and the trial judge “violate[d] the intent of [these] 
earlier decisions” by adopting the substance of the proposed opinion.55  
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit for applying this 
stricter standard.56 The Court criticized the verbatim adoption of 
findings of facts and acknowledged the potential for “overreaching and 
exaggeration” by attorneys writing these facts when they know they 
have won.57 However, the Court ultimately held that, even when a 
“judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the 
court.”58  
The Court then distinguished the case from potentially 
unacceptable practices, stating that “[u]nder these circumstances,” the 
findings likely represented the judge’s own conclusions and should not 
have been subject to stricter appellate review.59 The Court noted that 
 
 48. Id. at 568. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 571. 
 54. Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(alteration in original)). 
 55. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 56. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 566. 
 57. Id. at 572. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
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the lower court: (1) did not “uncritically” accept the findings, (2) gave 
guidance through a “framework,” (3) gave the defendant an 
opportunity to reply, and (4) varied the final opinion considerably from 
the proposed findings.60 Anderson restricted the ability of an appellate 
court to change the amount of deference it gives to a trial court’s 
decision without looking deeper into the circumstances of an adopted 
opinion. 
Circuit courts have distinguished or adopted Anderson in various 
ways. The Supreme Court has not clarified Anderson’s limitations,61 
except somewhat in the habeas context. In 2010, in Jefferson v. Upton,62 
the Court acknowledged that Anderson did not address findings 
adopted from the prosecution after an ex parte request in the habeas 
setting.63 The case was remanded, and the lower court conducted a de 
novo review of the habeas petition.64 Jefferson is discussed more 
extensively in Part III.A.3.  
2. Circuit courts have interpreted the limitations of ghostwritten 
opinions differently.  Despite the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
Anderson, circuit courts have interpreted the appropriateness of 
ghostwriting differently. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has upheld 
ghostwriting’s legality but “strongly criticize[s]” it.65 Meanwhile, the 
Ninth Circuit has created a carveout from adopting a party’s proposed 
opinion when that proposal is pulled from the party’s brief.66 This 
variance shows that Anderson is a limited opinion that leaves room to 
curtail the practice. The circuits do have one thing in common: they 
consistently take the opportunity to criticize ghostwriting. 
 
 60. Id. at 572–73. 
 61. See Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 731–32 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing a 
dismissal because the district court adopted an opinion that was only slightly edited and “there is 
no authority in the federal courts that countenances the preparation of the opinion by the attorney 
for either side” (quoting Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v. Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1961))); 
Morrison v. Char, 797 F.2d 752, 755 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that “the situation here is different” 
from Anderson because “these findings of fact were proposed to justify a motion for summary 
judgment, not to accompany a judgment after a full trial”). 
 62. Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284 (2010). 
 63. Id. at 294. 
 64. Id.; Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1387 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 65. Hamm v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 620 F. App’x 752, 756 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 66. Morrison, 797 F.2d at 755 n.3 (“But the situation here is different; these findings of fact 
were proposed to justify a motion for summary judgment, not to accompany a judgment after a 
full trial. As such, City of Bessemer City is inapposite.”). 
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As mentioned above, the Eleventh Circuit criticized ghostwritten 
opinions as recently as 2015 in Hamm’s case.67 However, the circuit also 
showed its disapproval of ghostwriting back in 1987, two years after 
Anderson. In Colony Square Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,68 the 
Eleventh Circuit reviewed an opinion by a Bankruptcy Court judge.69 
The opinion, ghostwritten by one of the parties, was adopted after 
some “minor typographical corrections.”70 The Bankruptcy Court 
judge had contacted one party ex parte, outlined what the opinion 
should say, and requested that the party draft it.71 The judge then 
adopted the opinion after some minor corrections.72 The other party 
was not informed of this arrangement at the time,73 but learned about 
it months later and filed a motion to have the opinion reviewed.74  
The Northern District of Georgia required the judge to answer 
interrogatories, held a five-day evidentiary hearing on the merits of the 
original case, and asked the parties to submit briefs.75 The district court 
then issued an opinion denying the motion for relief.76 
On appeal, the appellant argued that this ghostwriting was a 
violation of due process,77 but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed. 
Although frustrated by the practice, the court held that two factors—
that the judge made a final decision before requesting the proposed 
opinion, and that the bankruptcy judge’s supervising district court 
conducted an independent review—satisfied due process.78  
Despite holding that the ghostwritten opinion did not violate due 
process, the Eleventh Circuit dedicated an entire section of its opinion 
 
 67. Hamm, 620 F. App’x at 756 n.3 (“[W]e take this opportunity to once again strongly 
criticize the practice of trial courts’ uncritical wholesale adoption of the proposed orders or 
opinions submitted by a prevailing party.” (citation omitted)).  
 68. Colony Square Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Colony Square Co.), 819 F.2d 272 
(11th Cir. 1987). 
 69. Id. at 273. 
 70. Id. at 274. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. This Note does not dive into the constitutional argument that adopting proposed 
opinions violates due process.  Instead, it focuses on the state of current case law and solutions 
within that framework. However, the due process argument has been made successfully in the 
Northern District Court of Georgia, discussed below in Part III.A.3.a. 
 78. In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d at 276–77. 
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to condemning ghostwriting.79 It criticized the court’s verbatim 
adoption, failure to allow the other party the opportunity to respond, 
and ex parte communications.80 It explained the dangers of allowing a 
party to draft an opinion, including “the temptation to overreach and 
exaggerate” as well as giving a party an additional opportunity to “brief 
and argue.”81 Additionally, the court stated that the “quality of judicial 
decisionmaking suffers” when a judge delegates writing to a party 
because the writing process results in “stronger, sounder judicial 
rulings.”82 It is clear that ghostwriting destroys the impartiality sacred 
to a judicial opinion.  
Moving north, the Third Circuit, in Bright v. Westmoreland, 
distinguished Anderson as applying solely to findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, not to entire opinions.83 Bright involved an estate 
dispute.84 The court explained that, unlike findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, opinions “constitute the logical and analytical 
explanations of why a judge arrived at a specific decision.”85 The Third 
Circuit reversed the district court after it adopted the appellee’s 
proposed opinion with only minor changes.86 The court described 
opinions as the “core work-product of judges” and the proof that a 
“judge actively wrestled with [the litigant’s] claims . . . and made a 
scholarly decision based on his or her own reason and logic.”87 An 
adopted opinion from a party, the court wrote, “vitiates the vital 
purposes served by judicial opinions.”88   
Out west, in Morrison v. Char, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted 
Anderson as inapplicable to a case where the adopted findings of fact 
were pulled from arguments in a brief, rather than a proposed 
opinion.89 Therefore, the court subjected the district court’s findings of 
 
 79. Id. at 274–76. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 275. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 731–32 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 84. Id. at 733. 
 85. Id. at 732. 
 86. Id. at 731–32. 
 87. Id. at 732. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Morrison v. Char, 797 F.2d 752, 755 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing a brief to support 
a motion for summary judgment and proposed findings of fact). 
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fact in a legal malpractice suit to de novo review.90 The court then 
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.91  
The Federal Circuit, in reviewing a patent case, Pentec, Inc. v. 
Graphic Controls Corp., stated that the clear-error standard applies to 
ghostwritten findings of fact, citing Anderson, but that there may be 
“wariness on review.”92 It is unclear how an appellate court could even 
apply such contrary standards.  
After Anderson, circuit courts began to circumscribe ghostwriting, 
designating acceptable and unacceptable practices. This shows not only 
that Anderson failed to fully answer the numerous questions posed by 
ghostwriting, but also that there is nearly universal distaste for the 
practice in appellate courts. Circuit courts have all preached caution 
about ghostwritten opinions, and for good reason. Ghostwritten 
opinions fundamentally undermine the impartial judicial process. 
II.  PROBLEMS FOR JUSTICE 
Adopting verbatim an opinion written by a party gives rise to a 
host of problems. First, parties to the case are deprived of an impartial 
opinion. Second, if the case is appealed, the ghostwritten opinion can 
unfairly affect appellate review. Most importantly, ghostwritten 
opinions undercut the legitimacy of the judiciary by creating the 
appearance of bias. 
A. Depriving Parties of an Impartial Opinion 
An attorney’s role is to advocate for her client.93 When the same 
advocate is asked to write an impartial opinion, it may be difficult, if 
not impossible, to shed her role as advocate.94 Some attorneys may take 
advantage of the opportunity and write proposed opinions that are 
significantly biased toward their clients. In an extreme example, in 
Jefferson v. Sellers, the proposed opinion, which was adopted in full, 
 
 90. Id. at 755. 
 91. Id. at 757. 
 92. Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 313 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 93. See Kristin Fieldstad, Just the Facts, Ma’am - A Review of the Practice of the Verbatim 
Adoption of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 197, 218–19 (2000) 
(discussing conflict between attorneys’ duty to assist courts and their duty to be advocates for 
clients).  
 94. In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987) (“When an interested party 
is permitted to draft a judicial order without response by or notice to the opposing side, the 
temptation to overreach and exaggerate is overwhelming.”). 
ULATE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2018  5:03 PM 
2019] THE GHOST IN THE COURTROOM 821 
referred to an affidavit of a person who, as the reviewing court detailed, 
was “never contacted in connection with [the] case, and no such 
affidavit was submitted as evidence.”95 In Hamm’s case, the 
prosecution wrote, “contrary to Hamm’s assertion, there was no 
evidence before the jury that Hamm was not the triggerman.”96 This, 
of course, was not the defense’s position, and it was likely a hyperbolic 
description, inconsistent with judicial impartiality.  
Indeed, it is arguably an attorney’s duty to write the most 
favorable opinion for her client while still fulfilling her duty as an 
officer of the court. This creates the potential for actual bias in an 
opinion. The attorney remains an advocate first and an opinion writer 
second: she cannot don the mantle of neutrality after weeks, months, 
and sometimes even years of arguing for one side. Indeed, she should 
not be neutral because her job is to be a zealous advocate.  
On the other hand, a judge should not have a stake in the case 
beyond coming to the right legal conclusion.97 A written opinion by a 
judge assures parties—especially the losing party—that their issues 
have been thoroughly and respectfully addressed.98 The explanation in 
an opinion legitimizes the decision. Even if the losing party disagrees, 
it is given justification for the result. Removing this backstop robs a 
losing party of closure.99 An opinion adopted verbatim from the 
winning party still leaves doubt as to the judge’s reasoning. Parties go 
to court ready to accept a judge’s decision; that acceptance becomes 
more difficult when the explanation is written not by the judge, but by 
the opposing litigant. Parties in court deserve an unbiased explanation 
from the court, not the other side. 
B. Threatening Justice in Future Cases 
The purpose of the written judicial opinion is not to notify parties 
of who wins and who loses. That could easily be accomplished from the 
bench. Instead, a written opinion explains the judge’s reasoning to the 
 
 95. Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2017).  
 96. Hamm v. Alabama, No. CC 87-121.60 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1999).  
 97. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A judge shall 
uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”). 
 98. Not all opinions are published, but when an explanation of a decision is required, the 
parties are read the explanation in open court or are given the written opinion, even if it is not 
published. 
 99. See Panoff, supra note 2, at 326 (“It is the means by which a judge communicates with 
litigants.”).  
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parties, to students of the law, to future parties, and to other courts. 
The development of the law relies on these opinions.100 
When a judge adopts a party’s opinion verbatim, uncertainty 
about the judge’s thought process remains. An opinion tells the public: 
“This is the right way to think and talk about this case, and others like 
it.”101 Although the judge may agree with the proposed opinion’s major 
points, it is impossible that a party would be able to perfectly articulate 
a judge’s rationale on the first try.102 No two individuals think 
identically. This is especially so in this context, where the parties and 
the judge are tasked to think in fundamentally different ways. When a 
judge uncritically adopts a proposed opinion verbatim, the opportunity 
to understand the judge’s own reasoning and resolution is lost. Or 
worse, to the extent a party can perfectly capture a judge’s thinking, 
that itself implies a closeness between judge and advocate that 
undermines notions of impartiality in the judicial process.  
A judge’s first-hand explanation is especially important in the 
appellate process, which is meant to correct errors. Judicial opinions 
trace a case’s development. Every appellate court that reviews a case 
looks to the opinion before it, deferring to it in varying degrees.103 All 
standards of deference assume that the judge in the lower court has 
impartially and thoroughly addressed the various issues herself.104 But 
those assumptions are misplaced as to ghostwritten opinions. Take, for 
example, the recent case of Michigan v. Borthwell.105 There, an opinion 
 
 100. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“Stare decisis—in 
English, the idea that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is a ‘foundation stone 
of the rule of law.’” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014))).  
 101. James Boyd White, Judicial Opinion Writing—What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1363, 1366 (1995).  
 102. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 30, at 333 (1988) (“In most cases, I make substantial 
revisions to a [law clerk’s] draft opinion to ensure that the final opinion reflects precisely my views 
and analysis of the case.”).  
 103. Compare Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Folsom, 85 U.S. 237, 252 (1874) (explaining 
that findings of fact by the trial court cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court), with Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996) (holding that determinations of probable cause in a 
warrantless search should be reviewed de novo); see also Reif, supra note 22. 
 104. See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (giving broad 
deference to a district court on evidentiary rulings because of “a district court’s familiarity with 
the details of the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters”); see also Reif, supra note 
22, at 36 (explaining that deference “reflects an accommodation of the respective institutional 
advantages of trial and appellate courts”).  
 105. People v. Borthwell, No. 02-000276-01 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2018). 
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was pulled directly from a prosecutor’s brief.106 Of course, the language 
read more like an argument than an impartial judicial opinion. For 
example, the brief-opinion read: “Defendant asks this Court to grant a 
new trial on the basis of unreliable, biased and openly perjured 
testimony.”107 An appellate court must defer to a lower court’s 
language, biased or not, threatening an impartial appellate review.108 
Lower courts communicate with appellate courts by explaining 
their reasoning in opinions. This communication is essential. The 
parties can communicate with the appellate court through briefs or oral 
arguments, but the lower court opinion is the only way an appellate 
court understands the previous judge’s unique perspective. 
Ghostwriting can deprive the appellate court of the lower court’s 
perspective and, for the parties appealing, an opportunity for unbiased 
review. 
C. Undermining Confidence in the Judiciary 
The judicial process depends on legitimacy. The appearance of 
bias that ghostwritten opinions create threatens this legitimacy.109 This 
practice is not always exposed when it occurs.110 But, when the public 
becomes aware of it, as it did with Doyle Hamm,111 the secrecy escalates 
the appearance of bias. Even if an attorney who represents a party in 
the case manages to write impartially in the judge’s place, the 
appearance of bias still exists when a judge abdicates the role that the 
public expects her to fulfill.  
The public understands that an attorney is an advocate. An 
attorney fights for the interests of her client, while a judge impartially 
decides a case. But when a party writes the opinion, those roles become 
 
 106. A comparison of the court’s opinion, id., and the prosecution’s brief, People’s Response 
to Defendant’s Supplemental Brief on His Motion for Relief from Judgment, Borthwell, No. 02-
000276-01, shows that most of the substantive analysis of the opinion was pulled from the 
prosecution’s brief. 
 107. Id. at 3. 
 108. The language of an opinion is so important that two words can make all the difference. 
For example, Justice Scalia’s use of the phrase “homosexual agenda” in the Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), dissent alienated readers and overshadowed any legal argument. See Ian 
Samuel, The Counter-Clerks of Justice Scalia, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 10–12 (2016). 
 109. For examples of criticisms of the practice, see supra notes 3, 93.  
 110. Requests for proposed opinions sometimes occur ex parte, and then the final opinion 
never references that it was adopted from a proposed opinion.  
 111. See text accompanying supra note 3.  
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“blurred,” and the public can become confused.112 Who is the judge? 
Why, then, is the attorney writing the opinion? The public respects 
opinions because impartial judges wrote them. The legitimacy of the 
judicial process lies in the judge being a neutral decision-maker. That 
legitimacy dissipates when the advocate assumes the role of judge.113 
As the Third Circuit has explained, judges provide “neutral fora,” thus 
any “impropriety, or even the appearance thereof, undermines [the 
court’s] legitimacy and effectiveness.”114 Eventually, with enough 
opinions written by advocates, confidence in the courts will suffer.  
III.  SOLUTIONS 
The obvious, and most effective, solution to the problem of 
ghostwritten opinions is to prohibit them entirely. This would require 
increased resources for the courts and either a legislative or judicial 
overturning of Anderson. But because the Supreme Court has declined 
to adopt this solution, this Note proposes incremental steps. First, 
ghostwritten opinions should be eradicated from criminal cases. 
Second, judicial ethics rules should be changed to create clear 
standards regarding adopting proposed opinions. Ideally, opinions 
would never be authored by a party. These solutions would not 
eliminate ghostwriting completely, but they represent a step in the right 
direction. 
A. The Criminal Context 
1. Ghostwritten opinions are particularly dangerous in criminal 
cases.  A defendant’s freedom, or even her life, may be on the line in a 
criminal case. For that reason, criminal cases are fundamentally 
different than civil cases. Our system already recognizes this difference 
in myriad ways. For instance, the Constitution guarantees certain 
protections in the criminal context that are absent in the civil context.115 
 
 112. See Panoff, supra note 2, at 331. 
 113. A judge “shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 114. Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 731–32 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 115. Several constitutional provisions provide protections to criminal defendants that are not 
necessarily guaranteed in civil cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring probable cause for a 
warrant); id. amend. V (requiring a grand jury indictment for certain crimes, due process of law 
in a criminal case, and the ability to confront witnesses); id. amend. VI (requiring, in criminal 
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Because of their increased stakes, criminal cases magnify the issues that 
ghostwriting presents.116  
It is particularly important that the use of ghostwritten opinions in 
the criminal context be constrained.  Ghostwriting is used widely in 
criminal cases. The Equal Justice Initiative reported in 2003 that “the 
trial judge adopted verbatim an order denying or dismissing the Rule 
32 petition which was written by the State in seventeen of the 20 most 
recent capital cases.”117  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard,118 Judge 
Stuard, a trial-court judge in Ohio, was publicly reprimanded for 
communicating with a prosecutor ex parte while writing a capital 
sentencing opinion.119 Judge Stuard met with the prosecutor four times 
between the penalty phase and the sentencing phase of the trial to 
discuss and work on the sentencing opinion.120 The defense only 
learned about the ex parte contact when it noticed the prosecutor 
silently reading along with Judge Stuard as he announced the opinion 
from the bench.121 Similarly, in Fields v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,122 
the judge adopted a prosecutor’s proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law verbatim for a post-conviction motion.123 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that neither the findings 
nor the conclusions were clearly erroneous.124 Likewise, in Jefferson v. 
Zant,125 the prosecution ghostwrote a 45-page habeas decision in Butts 
 
cases, a speedy trial, with an impartial jury, in the jurisdiction of the crime, with the assistance of 
counsel); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment). 
 116. See Fieldstad, supra note 93, at 210 (explaining the difference between civil cases and 
criminal cases by referencing the dissenter in State v. Kenley, Judge Stith). In Kenley, the Missouri 
Supreme Court held that the lower court does not err by adopting a proposed opinion as long as 
the court considered the proposal carefully. Id. Judge Stith dissented, arguing that death is 
different and that upper courts have a duty to “determine whether the judge below . . . exercised 
his or her independent judgment in adopting the . . . findings.” Id. (quoting State v. Kenley, 952 
S.W.2d 250, 283 (Mo. 1997) (Stith, J. dissenting)). 
 117. Brief of Amici Curiae Alabama Appellate Court Justices and Bar Presidents in Support 
of the Petition for Certiorari at 15 n.15, Hamm v. Dunn, 138 S. Ct. 828 (No. 15-8753) (quoting 
Decl. of Aaryn M. Urell ¶ 4, Barbour v. Campbell, No. 01-S-1530-N (M.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2003)).   
 118. Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 901 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 2009).  
 119. Id. at 790. 
 120. Id. at 790–91. 
 121. Id. at 791. 
 122. Fields v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-SC-000231-TG, 2014 LEXIS 118 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2014). 
 123. Id. at *12–14. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Jefferson v. Zant, 431 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1993). 
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Superior Court in Georgia.126 The Georgia Supreme Court gave 
deference to this opinion and affirmed, rejecting Jefferson’s argument 
that the case should be reviewed under a lower standard than clear 
error.127 These are just a few examples of prosecutors writing judicial 
opinions.128 And although the full extent of this practice is difficult to 
discover—the judge’s name is the only one to appear on the opinion—
it is safe to assume that the practice extends beyond these few reported 
cases. 
Allowing prosecutors, instead of a judge, to write an opinion is 
especially detrimental in the criminal justice system, where a person’s 
freedom is on the line.129 This bias follows the case on appeal, 
continuing to influence the pursuit of justice.130 
2. Criminal cases are beyond the scope of Anderson.  Anderson is 
a limited opinion.131 Although it addresses ghostwriting, it only 
scratches the practice’s surface. Most importantly, Anderson was a civil 
case.132 The Supreme Court has not addressed ghostwriting in a 
criminal case. Given the need for increased protections in criminal 
cases, Anderson should not apply.  
Even if Anderson does apply, it should be interpreted narrowly. 
Specifically, appellate courts should only give ghostwritten opinions 
the customary deference when the trial court judge only sought 
proposed findings from the prosecutor (as opposed to the whole 
opinion), allowed the defense to respond to the proposed findings, and 
adopted the findings after revision.133 
 
 126. Id. at 111. 
 127. Id. at 114. 
 128. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 117, at 15–16; Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting 
Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. 
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 340, 355–56 (2006). 
 129. Although the same concerns apply to a defense attorney writing an opinion, I have not 
been able to find a single case where a defense attorney has ghostwritten an opinion. In a federal 
nonjury trial, the court must state its findings in writing if a party requests it. For this reason, 
prosecutors are perhaps less likely to request written findings when they lose, as that would 
potentially lead to a defense attorney writing a proposed opinion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c). 
 130. In 2010, there were an estimated 69,348 criminal appeals in state courts. NICOLE L. 
WATERS, ANNE GALLEGOS, JAMES GREEN & MARTHA ROZSI, DOJ, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN 
STATE COURTS 1 (2015) https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7J3-
XA2Q]. 
 131. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 564–56 (1985).  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
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These limitations correspond to the limitations in Anderson. As a 
reminder, in Anderson, the plaintiff won in a Title VII discrimination 
suit and the trial court adopted the plaintiff’s proposed opinion. 
Several factors limited the Supreme Court’s holding. First, only 
findings were adopted, not legal reasoning.134 Second, the losing party 
was given an opportunity to reply to the proposed findings before they 
were adopted by the judge.135 Finally, the opinion was not adopted 
verbatim, which the Supreme Court emphasized as an indication that 
the judge had made his own independent judgment.136 This is 
noteworthy because although the Court affirmed its precedent that a 
verbatim-adopted opinion is ultimately the court’s,137 it still focused on 
the district court’s revisions of the proposed findings as evidence of 
independent judgment.138 
a. Anderson should not apply to criminal cases.  Anderson and 
other cases addressing ghostwriting each ask whether the judge has 
independently reviewed the case.139 There are additional, cumulative 
concerns discussed above: the loss of the judge’s reasoning, actual or 
apparent bias, and the loss of legitimacy. Taking all these concerns into 
consideration, judges in criminal cases should be required to write the 
entire opinion without reliance on prosecutors as ghostwriters in order 
to receive deference in appellate courts. This is not inconsistent with 
Anderson, which was a civil, not a criminal, case. 
If a defendant provides evidence that the judge adopted a 
prosecutor’s proposed opinion verbatim, the state should have to 
respond with evidence that the lower court wrote its own opinion 
entirely before an appellate court grants the opinion the typical 
deference. The type of evidence required from the defendant would 
likely include the state’s proposed opinion, in order to compare it to 
the actual opinion. This would be difficult, but not impossible, to 
discover—after all, defense attorneys have discovered such opinions 
 
 134. Id. at 571. 
 135. Id. at 568. 
 136. Id. at 571–72. 
 137. See United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964).  
 138. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572–73. 
 139. See id. at 571–73; Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 380 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that the “central issue is whether the district court had made an independent 
judgment” (quoting Odeco, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 663 F.2d 650, 652–53 (5th Cir. 
1981))).  
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before.140 The state’s response should include evidence that it did not 
write the proposed opinion or that the actual opinion was not derived 
from the proposed opinion. This would be a determination of fact; the 
appellate court would determine if the defense or the state presents 
more reliable evidence of what occurred in the lower court. Even 
better, trial courts should be required to keep copies of proposed 
opinions on file. This transparency would make ghostwriting easier to 
discover.  
b. If Anderson applies to criminal cases, then it should be limited.  
If Anderson does apply to criminal cases, then ghostwritten opinions 
should receive no deference except under the precise circumstances 
present in Anderson. For a ghostwritten opinion to receive appellate 
deference, a judge should only adopt findings, not legal reasoning; 
should allow the defendant to respond to those findings; and should 
critically review the proposed findings.  
Appellate courts should enforce Anderson to ensure that 
ghostwritten opinions receive no deference without evidence of 
independent judicial review by the lower court. If a defendant provides 
evidence that findings were adopted verbatim from a prosecutor, that 
the defense was not given an opportunity to respond, or that the court 
adopted proposed legal reasoning, then the state should have to 
produce evidence of independent judicial review to rebut the 
implication that the lower court did not properly review the case. 
Anderson, read fully in conjunction with its facts, supports these 
limitations.141 At bottom, the appellate court should be given assurance 
before affording deference that the lower court did not “uncritically 
accept” a prosecutor’s proposed opinion. If the appellate court is not 
assured, then it should review the case de novo.  
As more instances of ghostwriting come to light, the case for 
reconsidering Anderson in its entirety strengthens. However, it is 
critical that, in the meantime, change at least occurs for criminal cases. 
Both possible solutions—putting criminal cases outside the scope of 
Anderson entirely or limiting deference in certain instances—address 
the problems with ghostwritten opinions: We do not lose the judge’s 
reasoning; because only factual findings can be adopted verbatim, 
 
 140. Forbidding entirely the practice of ex parte proposed opinions would help ensure that all 
parties have access to any proposed opinion in the case. 
 141. Anderson, 470 U.S. 564 at 572–73 (noting that the district court provided a framework 
for the proposed findings, the opposing party was given a chance to respond to the proposed 
findings, and the court revised the findings). 
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judges must produce their own legal analysis. Meanwhile, bias in the 
opinion is prevented by allowing the defense to respond to proposed 
findings and by giving defendants an opportunity to challenge the 
impartiality of these opinions in the appellate process. Legitimacy is 
consequently preserved.  
3. Habeas corpus petitions require safeguards against ghostwritten 
opinions.  The writ of habeas corpus is the final safeguard against abuse 
in the criminal system. The writ, petitioned for by the defendant, can 
command someone who has custody of the defendant, typically the 
warden of a prison, to release the defendant because of a trial defect.142 
A defendant petitions a court for this writ.143 The writ is available in all 
federal district courts, the Supreme Court, and some state courts.144 
The writ of habeas corpus is not only the last chance for a defendant to 
challenge a conviction, but it is also the last chance for the criminal 
system to fix its errors.145  
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA),146 which requires appellate courts to give more 
deference to lower courts when reviewing a habeas petition.147 In 2010, 
the Supreme Court, applying pre-AEDPA law, analyzed a 
ghostwritten opinion in the habeas context.148 The Court allowed the 
federal district court to determine whether the ghostwritten opinion 
should be given a presumption of correctness.149 The federal district 
court, declining to afford the ghostwritten opinion that presumption, 
stated that the “judge’s verbatim adoption of [the] proposed order . . . 
is an affront to the heightened concern with reliability and 
trustworthiness due a death penalty case and places the validity of the 
decision in issue.”150  
 
 142. Federal Habeas Corpus, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Fall-Winter, 1977–78, at 103, 103.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. This Note focuses on writs to federal courts, because writs to state courts have their 
own unique procedures.  
 145. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969) (“The writ of habeas corpus is the 
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state 
action.”).  
 146. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018)).  
 147. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).  
 148. See Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 287 (2010).  
 149. Id. at 294. 
 150. Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
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a. Ghostwritten opinions have not always received deference in 
habeas law.  In Jefferson v. Upton,151 the Supreme Court considered, 
but failed to thoroughly address, the issue of ghostwritten opinions in 
the habeas context. After a habeas hearing on alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel in state court, the judge contacted the state ex 
parte and asked the state’s attorney to prepare an opinion.152 The court 
adopted the opinion verbatim despite errors and the inclusion of 
statements of a witness who did not testify in the proceedings.153 
Jefferson’s case made it to the Supreme Court,154 and was subjected to 
a pre-AEDPA standard,155 assessing whether Jefferson received a “full 
and fair evidentiary hearing.”156  
The Court characterized Jefferson’s complaint regarding the 
ghostwriting as an argument that the process was deficient.157 The 
Court went on to distinguish the case from Anderson because it had 
not considered the application of the pre-AEDPA habeas statute to 
“findings . . . drafted exclusively by the attorneys for the State pursuant 
to an ex parte request from the state-court judge, who made no such 
request of [the defendant],” nor to instances in which it appears the 
judge may have not read the opinion.158 Because the Court felt the 
record of the state-court proceedings was underdeveloped, it 
remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit, which in turn remanded to 
the district court, to determine whether the State’s findings should be 
given a presumption of correctness.159  
The district court determined that no presumption of correctness 
should apply under habeas principles because Jefferson was not 
provided with a full and fair fact-finding process and therefore, was 
deprived of due process.160 The court noted that verbatim adoptions in 
capital cases are “especially troublesome” and expressed “substantial 
 
 151. Jefferson v. Upton,  560 U.S. at 287.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 288. 
 154. After the state habeas hearing, Jefferson took his case to the district court, which 
reversed, finding ineffective assistance of counsel even after accepting all of the findings as true. 
Id. at 289. A divided court of appeals reversed the district court. Id. 
 155. Jefferson filed his habeas application before the passage of AEDPA in 1996. Id. at 292. 
 156. Id. (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963)).  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 292. 
 159. Id.; Jefferson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, No. 07-12502, 2010 WL 
3431652 (11th Cir. July 21, 2010).   
 160. Jefferson v. Sellers, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1350–51 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
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doubt” that the opinion represented the court’s own “analysis and 
considered conclusions.”161  
The court distinguished Jefferson’s case from Anderson because 
the judge did not announce a decision from the bench, issue a 
preliminary memorandum, provide opposing counsel with an 
opportunity to respond, or revise the proposed opinion before 
adoption.162 The district court searched for and found no “indicia of the 
judge’s independent analysis and review . . . .”163 Therefore, the district 
court conducted a de novo review of Jefferson’s claim.164 The court 
granted Jefferson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacating his 
death sentence.165 
Under pre-AEDPA habeas principles, ghostwritten opinions were 
not automatically given deference. The troubling nature of 
ghostwritten opinions gave courts pause, forcing them to consider the 
implications of such opinions on due process. Although the case law 
predates AEDPA, the dangers posed by, and the need for protection 
from, ghostwritten opinions in habeas cases are still present post-
AEDPA.  
b. Certain ghostwritten opinions should not be given deference.  It 
is not clear how AEDPA affects the weighing of ghostwritten opinions 
in habeas petitions. Under § 2254(d), AEDPA forbids federal courts 
from issuing a writ of habeas corpus for a state-court proceeding that 
was adjudicated on the merits unless the decision was “contrary to” or 
involved an “unreasonable application” of federal law, or the result 
was based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts.”166 The 
Supreme Court has not explained the implications of this new standard 
on ghostwritten opinions.167  
The Court has, however, addressed how the new standard 
interacts with summary dispositions, which declare the state court’s 
 
 161. Id. at 1351–52. 
 162. Id. at 1352. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1387. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2018). 
 167. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 296 
(2006) (“The final issue worth mentioning is whether § 2254(d) applies in cases where the state 
district attorney or the state attorney general drafts the order denying collateral relief. . . . 
Eventually these and other AEDPA issues . . . will find their way to the Supreme Court.”).  
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decision but do not provide any reasoning. In Harrington v. Richter, 
the Court held that AEDPA deference applies to summary 
dispositions because the text of AEDPA does not require a written 
opinion.168 This decision muddles AEDPA’s application to summary 
dispositions and exceptions to § 2254(d). For an exception to apply 
under § 2254(d), the decision must be unreasonable.169 Without an 
explanation of the court’s reasoning, as in the case of summary 
dispositions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the 
decision was reasonable.170 Commentators have argued that there is a 
problem applying these dispositions to the text of the AEDPA 
exceptions.171  
Unlike summary dispositions, ghostwritten opinions may provide 
some explanation of a judge’s purported reasoning. However, that 
explanation may be that of a prosecutor, not the court. Without the 
assurance that the court critically reviewed the proposed opinion and 
agreed with its reasoning, a ghostwritten opinion becomes just as 
opaque as, or even more so than, a summary disposition. In fact, a 
ghostwritten opinion may be even more opaque. A summary 
disposition written by a judge at least implies that the judge 
independently reviewed the case. But with a ghostwritten opinion, we 
know only that the prosecutor reviewed the issues. In Doyle Hamm’s 
case, where the judge adopted every word of the state’s proposed 
opinion and even failed to remove “Proposed” from the title, there is 
very little assurance that the opinion represents how the judge 
analyzed Hamm’s case. Without an explanation from the court itself, it 
is difficult to determine if the decision was unreasonable under § 
2254(d). Requiring the petitioner to prove that there was no reasonable 
basis for a decision, especially without the court’s own explanation of 
 
 168. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (“There is no text in [§ 2254(d)] 
requiring a statement of reasons. . . . Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an 
explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable 
basis for the state court to deny relief.”). 
 169. § 2254(d). The Court put the burden on the habeas petitioner to show there was no 
reasonable basis for the decision. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. 
 170. See Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s 
Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 469, 473–74 (2012) (“[A] written opinion 
may provide the best, and perhaps only, ground for determining the reasonableness of the 
decision that it accompanies.”). 
 171. See, e.g., id. at 474–75 (discussing two incorrect proposed approaches to AEDPA’s 
applicability to summary dispositions and proposing a new approach). 
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that decision, is beyond the text of § 2254(d) and is not supported by 
the legislative history.  
The legislative history shows that Congress did not view § 2254(d) 
as a drastic measure that would eliminate federal habeas review. 
Rather, § 2254(d) was the result of multiple compromises; it requires 
federal courts to consider state-court determinations but preserves 
federal courts’ authority to review these determinations for 
reasonableness.172 During the debates surrounding § 2254(d), Senator 
Joe Biden expressed concerns that the statute would foreclose federal 
courts from reviewing state courts.173 Senator Orrin Hatch disputed this 
claim, arguing that § 2254(d) would require a speedier federal review 
of state decisions but that it would not foreclose federal review.174 
President Clinton’s signing statement on AEDPA expressed 
confidence that “[f]ederal courts will interpret these provisions to 
preserve independent review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock 
constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.”175  
In sum, it is clear that § 2254(d) was not meant to rubber stamp 
state decisions. But, when federal courts are expected to defer to 
verbatim adopted opinions, they are doing precisely that. 
Although AEDPA limited federal habeas review, the federal 
backstop still exists. Both the exceptions under § 2254(d) and the 
legislative history acknowledge the need for federal review of state 
decisions. When an opinion is adopted verbatim without critical review 
by the court, there is no way for a federal habeas court to determine if 
the decision was reasonable. Ghostwritten opinions deprive the federal 
courts of any meaningful opportunity for review. This an unacceptable 
outcome. Federal habeas courts should not defer to ghostwritten 
opinions. Instead, federal courts should require state courts to provide 
 
 172. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 
422–23 (1996) (explaining that AEDPA was the result of compromises and was not meant to 
deprive federal courts of the ability to review habeas petitions).  
 173. “[T]he Republican provision to reform habeas corpus procedures would require Federal 
courts to defer to State court decisions even when the State court has made an incorrect decision 
on habeas corpus.” 141 CONG. REC. S7486 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 174. “[I]t requires the Federal courts, once a petition is filed, to complete the judicial action 
within the specified time period. . . . This bill requires deference to court action unless there is 
some very good reason not to defer . . . .” 142 CONG. REC. S3362 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch).  
 175. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 1 PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 25, 1996), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1996-
book1/pdf/PPP-1996-book1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDU9-N4LY]. 
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an explanation from the judge before determining if a § 2254(d) 
exception applies.  
B. Changes to Ethics Rules 
Rather than relying on appellate courts, the ills of ghostwritten 
opinions can be mitigated ex ante through judicial ethics rules. Most 
states have adopted some form of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
promulgated by the American Bar Association.176 At the federal level, 
judges are governed by the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges,177 which 
is an adaptation of the Model Code.178 Federal judges also have the 
Federal Benchbook, a nonbinding guide created by experienced 
district court judges.179 None of these codes explicitly prohibit judges 
from adopting proposed opinions verbatim in criminal cases. They 
should. At minimum, these codes should require a judge to critically 
review proposed opinions and allow the opposing side to respond.  
The 1990 edition of the Model Code included a comment stating: 
“A judge may request a party to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, so long as the other parties are apprised of the 
request and are given an opportunity to respond to the proposed 
findings and conclusions.”180 This comment was to rule 3(B)(7), which 
addressed ex parte communications and the parties’ right to be heard 
by the judge.181 The comment was removed in the 2007 version of the 
Model Code because the Commission believed “the permissibility of 
 
 176. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); C.T. Harhut, Ex Parte 
Communication Initiated by a Presiding Judge, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1995) (noting that 
“[m]ost states and the federal courts have adopted some version” of the ABA model rules for 
judicial conduct). 
 177. U.S. COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges [https://perma.cc/ 
XN9C-XVPF]. 
 178. On the American Bar Association’s website, “Federal Implementation of the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct” links to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Text of Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, AM. BAR. ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics_regulation/mcjc.html [https://perma.cc/ 
95UR-DAHU]. 
 179. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES ii (6th ed. Mar. 
2013) (“This Benchbook is not a statement of official Federal Judicial Center policy. Rather, it 
was prepared by, and it represents the considered views of . . . a group of experienced district 
judges . . . .”). 
 180. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7) cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990) 
(amended 2011). 
 181. Canon 3(B)(7) of the 1990 Model Code correlates to 2.6 and 2.9 of the 2011 version.  
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the practice was so free from doubt as to render the Comment 
unnecessary.”182 The Commission’s view, therefore, is that judges can 
adopt proposed findings and conclusions of law, but only with the 
response of the opposing party. Failure to provide opposing counsel an 
opportunity to respond is thus arguably an ethics violation. 
Importantly, the Commission has not addressed the verbatim adoption 
of proposed full opinions that include the legal analysis. Both the 
removal of the comment to 3(B)(7) and the lack of guidance regarding 
whole opinions create uncertainty within the Model Code about the 
ethics of adopting proposed opinions.  
The Federal Benchbook also creates uncertainty. In the civil 
motions section, it explains that adopting or denying parties’ proposed 
findings and conclusions is not necessary and that “[s]ome courts of 
appeals look with a jaundiced eye on district court findings or 
conclusions that follow counsel’s requests verbatim.”183 Notably, it 
does not address adopting a whole opinion and it does not address 
ghostwriting in any form in the criminal context.184 
This uncertainty should be eliminated in ethics codes and 
guidelines. When judges know what is expected of them, they can 
adjust their conduct accordingly. And those that fail to adhere can be 
fairly disciplined. Acknowledging that time may not permit all judges 
to write their own opinions from scratch, ethics codes and guides 
should require a minimum level of review to ensure ethics values are 
met. Canon 2 of the Model Code requires judges to perform their 
duties impartially.185 More specifically, Rule 2.6 of the Model Code 
ensures the right to be heard,186 and Rule 2.9 forbids ex parte 
communications, subject to some exceptions.187 Explicitly requiring 
judges to critically review proposed opinions and to allow the opposing 
party to respond fulfills the ethics standards of Canon 2 and its 
accompanying rules.  
 
 182. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (amended 2011). 
 183. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 208 (6th ed. Mar. 
2013).  
 184. See generally id. (failing to address proposed opinions in the criminal context). 
 185. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 186. Id. Rule 2.6. 
 187. Id. Rule 2.9 (prohibiting ex parte communications generally before enumerating 
exceptions). 
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Ohio has already confronted the ethics implications of 
ghostwritten opinions.188 In 2006, in State v. Roberts,189 the Ohio 
Supreme Court vacated a capital sentence because the judge worked 
with the prosecutor ex parte to draft the sentencing opinion.190 
Following this decision, prosecutors in Ohio informed judges that they 
could no longer draft “entries” for the court.191 A Trumbull County 
prosecutor informed judges that State v. Roberts called the “legality 
and ethics” of drafting entries for the court into question.192 The 
prosecutor suggested that the judges do what other courts have done 
and hire secretaries and lawyers to draft the entries.193 However, if the 
court still wanted prosecutors to draft entries, the prosecutor requested 
that this be put on the record and the defense be given an opportunity 
to submit an entry or object.194  
Ohio’s judicial conduct organization has also addressed 
ghostwritten opinions.195 In 2009, with Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 
the court publicly reprimanded a judge who communicated with a 
prosecutor ex parte to write the judicial opinion.196 The court found 
that the judge had violated Canon 2, which requires the judge to 
respect the law and act in a way that “promotes public confidence in 
 
 188. Iowa has also addressed ghostwriting by requiring notification to opposing parties. See 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Retired Judge Wrongly Used Ghostwritten Rulings Without Notifying 
Opposing Parties, Report Says, ABA J. (June 5, 2018, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/retired_judge_wrongly_used_ghostwritten_rulings_with
out_notifying_opposing/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_e
mail [https://perma.cc/4RBD-N9EQ] (describing one Iowa judge’s use of proposed rulings written 
by attorneys in potentially hundreds of civil cases, contrary to the requirements of a 1984 Iowa 
Supreme Court decision). 
 189. State v. Roberts, 850 N.E.2d 1168 (Ohio 2006). 
 190. Id. at 1172. 
 191. Letter from David M. Toepter, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, to Judges Peter 
J. Kontos, Andrew D. Logan, W. Wyatt McKay and John M. Stuard (Dec. 5, 2006), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/documents/2891965-2006-12-5-Letter-to-Trumbull-County-
Judges [https://perma.cc/9UKK-PFX2].  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 59, 60 (1998) (“By 1981, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had created judicial 
conduct organizations empowered to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate allegations of judicial 
misbehavior.” (citation omitted)).  
 196. Disciplinary Counsel v. Stuard, 901 N.E.2d 788, 790 (Ohio 2009). 
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the integrity of the judiciary,” and Canon 3(B)(7), which prohibits ex 
parte communications.197  
Although current ethics codes could tackle the problem of 
ghostwritten opinions through an interpretation of Canon 2 of the 
Model Code, explicit language is better suited to eliminate a practice 
that has, unfortunately, become normalized. If ethics rules expressly 
forbid certain types of ghostwriting, then courts will know exactly what 
is expected and can conform to the new guidelines. New standards 
should require that judges independently review proposed opinions, 
refrain from adopting proposed opinions verbatim, and allow the 
opposing side to reply. These standards all derive from the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in Anderson.  
States could also pass legislation requiring the same standards 
discussed above. There is some debate about state legislatures’ roles in 
prescribing court rules.198 However, where the legislature does have the 
authority to pass a law prohibiting ghostwritten opinions, states should 
consider ensuring the discussed standards with the force of law.  
CONCLUSION 
Ghostwritten opinions are rotting the criminal system, slowly 
degrading ideals of impartiality. They deprive us of the judge’s analysis 
and create the appearance of and potential for bias. Consequently, the 
judicial process loses legitimacy. This leads to severe consequences in 
the criminal justice system, as people are locked away or their death 
sentence is justified through an opinion written by the very person 
charged with prosecuting them. Supreme Court precedent allows 
appellate courts to dispatch with the ordinary deference afforded trial 
court opinions when those opinions contain these egregious problems. 
Appellate deference should be given to a ghostwritten opinion only 
when the judge critically reviewed the proposed opinion, did not adopt 
it verbatim, and it was composed after the opposing party had an 
opportunity to reply. Ideally, states will forbid adopting proposed 
opinions without these requirements, through ethics rules or statute. 
We cannot allow our criminal system to be corrupted by the problems 
of ghostwritten opinions—we should demand impartial adjudication. 
 
 197. Id. at 791 (quotation omitted). 
 198. Legislative Assaults on State Courts - 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/legislative-assaults-state-courts-2018 
[https://perma.cc/4KC3-F6L8] (documenting trends with respect to “legislative assaults on the 
courts,” or bills which would “diminish the role or independence of the judicial branch”). 
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It is time to attack this practice that has haunted courtrooms for too 
long.  
 
